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Abstract 
We investigate the incentives for vertical or horizontal integration in the financial security 
service industry, consisting of trading, clearing and settlement. We thereby focus on firms’ 
decisions but also look on the implications of these decisions on competition and welfare. Our 
analysis shows that the incentives for vertical integration crucially depend on industry as well 
as market characteristics. A more pronounced demand for liquidity clearly favors vertical 
integration whereas deeper financial integration increases the incentives to undertake vertical 
integration only if the efficiency gains associated with vertical integration are sufficiently 
large. Furthermore, we show that market forces can suffer from a coordination problem that 
end in vertically integrated structures that are not in the best interest of the firms. We believe 
this problem can be addressed by policy measures such as the TARGET2-Securities program. 
Furthermore, we use our framework to discuss major industry trends and policy initiatives. 
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Security exchanges and central security depositories (CSDs) are at the center of modern
capital markets around the world. However, across continents and markets, we observe
very diﬀerent industry structures. On the one hand, we ﬁnd a much more fragmented
structure in Europe with more than 40 exchanges and roughly 20 CSDs (cf. FESE (2008))
as compared to the U.S. market with only a dozen exchanges and only two CSDs. On
the other hand, the degree of vertical integration diﬀers signiﬁcantly among European
countries and markets with, for example, strong vertical integration in Germany and
much less vertical integration in other markets such as the United Kingdom.
At the same time, industry observers as well as policy makers expect further consolida-
tion and change in the ﬁnancial-security service industry (consisting of security exchanges
and CSDs) in the years to come (see Economist (2006)). While all observers agree that
changes in industry are under way, it is much less clear which direction these changes will
take and what is desirable from the point of view of industry participants and society as
a whole.
Against this background our analysis aims to provide some insights into the dynam-
ics of the industrial organizations of the ﬁnancial-security service industry, most notably
into the interrelation of organizational design and market structure. Thereby, our main
research questions are: Under what circumstances are vertical or horizontal integration
more attractive? What does this do to the industrial organization of the industry? Which
organizational and industrial structures are preferable from a welfare point of view? We
thereby concentrate on vertical integration, or to put it using the subtitle of our paper:
what are the advantages (the grain) of vertical integration (the silo)? On the basis of
our answers to these questions, we also address recent industry development and reg-
ulatory initiatives and ask how these developments and initiatives aﬀect the industrial
organization of the ﬁnancial-security service industry.
We take up these general research questions and investigate the drivers behind ver-
tical as opposed to horizontal integration in the ﬁnancial-security service industry. Our
analysis shows that the incentives for vertical integration depend on industry and mar-
ket characteristics such as the degree of ﬁnancial market integration as well as the role
that the liquidity eﬀect plays for traders. We show that the more pronounced traders’
preferences for liquidity the more pronounced the incentive to vertically integrate. This
is not only true absolutely (i.e., with respect to the decision to vertically integrate or
to stay completely non-integrated) but also in comparison to the decision to integrate
horizontally.
At the same time, our theoretical reasoning suggests that vertical integration harms
competitors. We show that ﬁnancial-security service providers might fall into a coordi-
2nation trap. If it is proﬁtable for one exchange to integrate vertically, the incentives for
further ﬁrms to vertically integrate increase. This trend can lead to a bad equilibrium
in which ﬁrms are in sum worse oﬀ than compared to a situation in which the industry
is completely non-integrated. This point becomes more important if one thinks about an
industry that starts with a certain degree of vertical integration due to, e.g., historical cir-
cumstances. When comparing vertical and horizontal integration, we ﬁnd that the market
solution has a tendency for too much vertical integration if the liquidity eﬀect is suﬃ-
ciently low. We interpret measures such as TARGET2-Securities as policy instruments to
provide politically enforced horizontal integration that can overcome this tendency.
We extend our model by considering listing decisions and OTC (Over-The-Counter)
trading. We argue that vertical integration decreases the market coverage of listed secu-
rities for which ﬁrms have to be compensated by lower listing fees. Similarly, the larger
the OTC market in respective asset classes the lower are the incentives for vertical inte-
gration. Furthermore, we use our framework to discuss major industry trends and policy
initiatives. We argue that vertical integration is an instrument to protect an exchange’s
home market against new competitors, such as Multilateral Trading Facilities, but new
pricing schemes such as Maker-Taker pricing and the emergence of Algo-Trading might
reduce the incentives to integrate vertically.
To derive these results, we propose a stylized model that depicts the interrelation
between the organizational design of ﬁnancial-security service providers and the compe-
tition among them. The model incorporates economies of scope as well as network eﬀects
at the diﬀerent levels of the value chain of the ﬁnancial-security service industry. We
delineate traders’ preferences for securities listed and traded on diﬀerent exchanges by
employing the Salop-model. Traders as well as exchanges are exogenously located on this
circle depicting the concept of a natural aﬃnity of certain traders for certain exchanges
(e.g., due to language barriers, home bias, etc). We allow for competition among three
exchanges. The securities listed on a certain exchange are settled in the associated (po-
tentially organization-wise) independent CSD. We neglect custodian banks and therefore
provide a barebones picture of the industry and the competition therein. We view vertical
integration as a measure to implement a highly speciﬁc relation between an exchange
and the associated CSD that makes trades routed through this link less costly but im-
pose additional costs to trades that are settled outside the associated CSD or traded on
another exchange but settled in the associated CSD. In that sense our idea of vertical
integration is close in spirit to Grossman and Hart (1986). It also resembles the idea of
vertical integration in the ﬁnancial-security service industry as a decision for a closed
rather than an open standard that makes external linkages partially incompatible with
internal processes. Horizontal integration on the level of CSDs, in turn, is modeled as
3uniform cost-reductions displaying the concept of economies of scale and scope at this
layer.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature on the ﬁnancial-securities
service industry. First, our paper touches on the topic of competition between trading
platforms. This is analyzed in diﬀerent manners by, e.g., Foucault and Parlour (2004),
Di Noia (2002), and Shy and Tarkka (2001) where the latter also involve a vertical relation
between the brokers and stock exchanges. But all these papers focus on the role of alliances
between stock exchanges, i.e., cooperation on a horizontal level whereas we focus on
vertical cooperation.
Second, our paper has analogies to the question of interlinking securities settlement
systems as is analyzed by Kauko (2004) and Kauko (2007).
Third, our work is directly related to the literature on vertical integration in the
ﬁnancial-securities service industry. K¨ oppl and Monnet (2007) present a model that in-
vestigates the role of private information about costs in a merger between a stock exchange
and a settlement provider. They conclude that vertical silos can prevent eﬃcient consol-
idation on a horizontal level. In contrast, Holthausen and Tapking (2007) and Rochet
(2005) model the vertical relation between custodian banks and a CSD. In Holthausen
and Tapking (2007) the CSD is input provider and competitor simultaneously. They show
that the CSD leverages its monopoly power to compete for customers at the custodian
level by raising it rivals’ costs. Rochet (2005) asks whether a CSD should compete directly
with custodian banks, or, in other words, should CSDs be allowed to integrate vertically
with custodian banks. He concludes that the welfare eﬀect of such a merger hinges on the
trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency gains and lower competition on the custodian level due to the
merger. This trade-oﬀ will be the center of attention in our paper as well. We, however,
focus on a quite diﬀerent aspect of the value chain which involves very diﬀerent economic
mechanisms.
The most relevant paper to our analysis is Tapking and Yang (2006). They analyze dif-
ferent industry settings in the sense of vertical or horizontal integration in a two-country
model. They conclude that from a social perspective horizontal integration dominates ver-
tical integration, which itself is better than no consolidation. We diﬀer from their approach
by focusing mainly on private incentives rather than pursuing a pure welfare analysis. In
addition, we incorporate network eﬀects as a major feature of the ﬁnancial-security service
industry. These network eﬀects turn out to be a main driver of our analysis. Furthermore,
we concentrate on the eﬃciency gain stemming from organizational restructuring that
should be associated with the merger, whereas Tapking and Yang (2006) take only strate-
gic eﬀects in their analysis of vertical integration into account. That is, in contrast to
their approach, we explicitly focus on the underlying driver of organizational change and
4its interaction with competition.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline the structure of the
industry and then turn to the basic model in Section 3. On the basis of this, we discuss the
incentives and consequences of vertical integration in Section 4. We thereby diﬀerentiate
between a starting point in which any vertical integration is absent and one in which
a certain ﬁnancial-security service provider is already vertically integrated. With this
distinction we aim to look into the potential cumulative eﬀects as well as into situations
in which history may matter. In Section 5, we compare vertical with horizontal integration.
Section 6 discusses the endogenous listing decision and OTC trading as extensions of the
model while Section 7 analyzes the implications of the emergence of Multilateral Trading
Facilities, Algo-Trading, and TARGET2-Securities. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Functioning and structure of the industry
Before turning to our model, we illustrate the basic structure of the industry by describing
the functions of the securities transaction process as well as the main players in the
market. The securities transaction process is basically characterized by three functions.
The ﬁrst function is the actual trading process, e.g., the matching of buyer and seller
which usually takes place on the exchanges, alternative trading platforms, or via Over-
The-Counter one-to-one trading. At this stage, an enormous network eﬀect known as the
liquidity eﬀect is present. Traders favor exchanges on which other traders and therefore
liquidity concentrate because it decreases the inﬂuence of their orders on the price. In
addition, economies of scale and scope have an association with this process because the
infrastructure can be used for many trades in the same as well as in other securities,
leading to signiﬁcant savings in ﬁxed costs.
The second function is the clearing process. In this process, the bi-/multilateral obli-
gations are calculated by the Clearing House, which in recent years has more frequently
involved a Central Counterparty (CCP). The CCP takes the legal position of everyone’s
counterparts and therefore bears the risk of these participants. Usually it is able to net
the trades and therefore bears less risk than the sum of the risk the original counterparts
would otherwise have had to. Hence, again economies of scale and scope are present at
this stage. The CCP are facing lower net risks if diﬀerent securities or more of the same
security are cleared in the particular CCP. Usually the clearing house is owned by the
exchange.
The third function is the settlement process in which transactions are completed and
the cash and securities are transferred. This service is usually oﬀered by central security
depositories (CSDs) that hold the securities and allow transactions by book entry. Again
diﬀerent systems can be used for diﬀerent securities, and cash settlements might be netted
5that imply the presence of economies of scope at this stage. Beside CSDs also custodian
banks can oﬀer these services and take the role of an intermediary. They usually have an
account at the main CSDs that allows their customers to trade securities kept at diﬀerent
CSDs (usually diﬀerent countries) via one account.
Furthermore the CSDs oﬀer safe-keeping for securities, e.g., the distribution of infor-
mation by the security issuer, dividend ﬂow, etc. The safe-keeping is needed to perform
transactions but,unlike some other processes, it is not necessarily involved in every trans-
action.
If an entity owns the provider of all three transaction services we refer to this as a
vertically integrated exchange or a silo.
3 The basic model
We consider a setting in which three exchanges or trading platforms (i = A,B,C)c o m p e t e
with each other. Besides the three exchanges, there exist three central security depositories
(j = A,B,C). Central security depositories may or may not be vertically integrated
with the exchanges. Clearing services are provided by the trading platform and therefore
are not considered separately. The costs to trade one unit of a security are identical
across all three exchanges and denoted by cT, the cost of settlement for CSD i is cS
i .A
security that is listed on a particular exchange is kept in the respective CSD implying
that a given security can be traded on diﬀerent exchanges but is settled in only one CSD,
giving that CSD monopoly power in this process. We assume perfect competition between
custodian banks and therefore neglect them in our analysis. The total number of securities
is normalized to one. The number of securities listed on either exchange is denoted by ni.
Traders are uniformly distributed on the perimeter of a circle with a length equal
to one and a density equal to one. All consumers demand inelastically one unit of each
security listed on any of the three exchanges. The reservation price for all traders for
trading and settlement services is denoted by V . This reservation price excludes the price
of the security traded that we normalize for matters of simplicity to zero. Because we are
only interested in the overall number of trades rather than the bilateral relation between
seller and buyer, this reservation price is assumed to be identical for all traders. The three
exchanges and the corresponding CSDs are symmetrically located on the perimeter of the
circle at 0, 1/3a n d2 /3. Although CSDs can price discriminate between trades originated
at diﬀerent exchanges, exchanges cannot price discriminate between securities kept at
diﬀerent CSDs.
We denote the price of CSD j for trades taking place on exchange i by pS
ij while pT
i
stands for the price of exchange i charged for prices taking place on exchange i. Traders
who have to pay both prices are assumed to expect the exchange in which the security is
6listed as being the more liquid one, hence, increasing the utility of traders trading on this
platform by k. This is in line with the empirical observation that the liquidity of a stock
is usually concentrated on the stock exchange where the company got its primary listing
(see Halling, Pagano, Randl, and Zechner (2008)). In the following, we refer to k as the
liquidity parameter.
The further away a trader is located from the exchange he or she is actually trading on,
the higher the disutility he or she realizes from the trade. Suppose a trader is located at
x and trades on exchange i. Let the closest distance between the trader and the exchange
be deﬁned as gi
x. Then, the trader realizes a disutility of tgi
x with t denoting the degree
of diﬀerentiation across the exchanges. This disutility term reﬂects the idea that there
are diﬀerences across exchanges that merely stem from locational diﬀerences, such as
language, regulation, and the like. The more pronounced these diﬀerences are the larger
t is. We interpret this parameter t as the degree of ﬁnancial market integration. The
less integrated ﬁnancial markets, the larger t is. We are aware that these diﬀerences
usually take the form of discrete steps. Our continuous setup reﬂects the fact that these
features are of diﬀerent importance for diﬀerent kind of traders (institutional, private,
high-frequency). These diﬀerent perception of the diﬀerences could be taken into account
by a continuous function.
Therefore, we can state the utility of a trader being located at point x on the perimeter
of the circle who considers buying one unit of a security that is listed on exchange A as
follows
U
A
x =

V − pT
A − pS
AA + k − tgA
x if trading takes place on exchange A
V − pT
j − pS
Aj − tgj
x if trading takes place on exchange j (j = B,C)
(1)
In cases in which securities are listed on exchange B or C the corresponding utility func-
tions apply.
Our analysis rests on the idea that the market is not fully covered, hence, leaving room
for market coverage eﬀects from vertical integration. Thereby, we also avoid that CSDs
face a price-inelastic demand with all the special features of such a speciﬁc demand curve.
Our no-full-coverage assumption is in line with the clearly observed home bias (see e.g.
Tesar and Werner (2008)) by which investors focus more heavily on local securities, e.g.,
by concentrating on the (perceived) costs of price dispersion as well as the (perceived)
informational advantages from buying local assets. In the absence of fully covered markets,
investors do trade local securities overproportionally as compared to securities listed on
other exchanges.
Furthermore, we impose a regularity assumption that states that the competition
between exchanges takes place for the marginal trader being located between them, a
standard assumption in the Salop-type model. Although, the ﬁrst concept requires that
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Figure 1: Industry structure of a security listed on A
transport costs are suﬃciently large, the second one demands that the liquidity eﬀect is
not too large to avoid making the exchange on which the security is listed too strong.
More precisely, we impose:
Assumption 1
t>k>
1
3
t
Assumption 2
11
12
t>v>
9
8
t −
5
8
k
with v = V − cS − cT being the net social reservation price or the gains from the trade.
Therefore, we can derive the total demand of the trading platform on which the security
is listed (say A) as the sum of the two marginal traders (xA
1 and 1−xA
2 , see ﬁgure 1) being
located between this platform and the two trading platforms with which it competes
(B and C). Total demand for the two remaining platforms stems from the sum of the
respective demand accruing to these platforms when competing with platform A (
1
3 −xA
1
for platform B and xA
2 − 2
3 for platform C) as well as the respective demand arising from
the marginal traders on platforms B and C who are just indiﬀerent between buying or
not buying at all (xA
3 − 1
3 for platform B as well as 2
3 − xA
4 for platform B).
The assumptions stated above ensure that 0 <x A
1 < 1/3, 2/3 <x A
2 < 1a sw e l la s
xA
3 <x A
4 , i.e., the marginal traders for which platforms A and B as well as A and C
compete is located strictly between them. The last inequality implies that the market is
not fully covered.
8Deriving the marginal traders from the indiﬀerence conditions (of buying from a com-
peting platform or buying not at all) yields the following demand functions:
d
A
AB = xA
1 =
pT
B − pT
A + pS
AB − pS
AA + k + 1
3t
2t
(2)
d
A
AC =1 − xA
2 =
pT
C − pT
A + pS
AC − pS
AA + k + 1
3t
2t
(3)
d
A
BA = 1
3 − xA
1 =
pT
A − pT
B − pS
AB + pS
AA − k +
1
3t
2t
(4)
d
A
CA = xA
2 −
2
3 =
pT
A − pT
C − pS
AC + pS
AA − k + 1
3t
2t
(5)
d
A
BB = xA
3 − 1
3 =
V − pT
B − pS
AB
t
(6)
d
A
CC =
2
3 − xA
4 =
V − pT
C − pS
AC
t
, (7)
with dA
iB denoting the demand for trades on platform i of securities listed on platform A
when competing with platform B.
The total demand for trades on platform i for a security listed on platform A emerges
as dA
A = dA
AB + dA
AC, dA
B = dA
BA + dA
BB,a n ddA
C = dA
CA + dA
CC. In case trading for a security
takes place on platforms B or C, demand functions can be derived be simply replacing A
with the respective platform on which the security is listed.
Hence we can state the proﬁt function of the trading platforms as
π
T
i =( nid
i
i +

i =j
njd
j
i)

p
T
i − c
T
(8)
as well as of the settlement platform of
π
S
i = ni

j
(pij − c
S)d
i
j. (9)
4 Vertical Integration in the Trading Industry
We now turn to the analysis of vertical integration. Therefore, we start with a setting
in which there is no vertical integration at all and one of the entities, say A, considers
integrating trading and settlement. We refer to this as the stand-alone case. Later on, we
contrast this with the decision to vertically integrate trading and settlement in A given
that the other two entities are already vertically integrated. This comparison allows us to
investigate potential cumulative eﬀects of vertical integration: is vertical integration more
or less likely if the other exchanges are already vertically integrated?
How do we depict vertical integration? We interpret vertical integration as a process
which allows speciﬁc adjustments between the respective trading and settlement processes
9(e.g., establishing more eﬃcient straight-through-processing) as well as faster coordina-
tion in the vertically integrated organization as compared to arm’s length transactions.
Vertical integration allows for speciﬁc investments between trading and settlement, most
notably in the area of software and IT processes. In the absence of vertical integration,
such speciﬁc investment might lead to severe hold-up problems between the two parties in-
volved. Hence, our interpretation of vertical integration is on the one hand in line with the
information we have gotten from many industry experts (which we received in the course
of a number of interviews and discussions) and on the other hand conforms with the basic
arguments from the theory of ﬁrm literature in the tradition of Grossman and Hart (1986).
4.1 Private Incentives to integrate
4.1.1 The stand-alone case
These speciﬁc investments tie trading platform A and settlement A together. However, this
closer link between the two comes at a cost: it makes the interaction of trading platform
A with the other two settlement organizations as well as the interaction of settlement in
A with the two other trading platforms more costly because for them it becomes more
diﬃcult to route trades of securities not listed on platform A. Hence, vertical integration
resembles a closed standard (with basically a (partially) incomplete technology). The
eﬃciency of the standard increases but the interaction with agents outside the standard
becomes more diﬃcult (see e.g. Shy (2001)). We depict this concept as follows. With the
vertical integration of settlement and trading in A, trades on A are settled at lower costs
in A (cS
AA = cS −y) but all cross-routings become more costly (cS
AC = cS
AB = cS
CA = cS
BA =
cS + y), with y denoting the eﬃciency parameter associated with vertical integration.
This entire process of vertical integration, which creates a more eﬃcient link between
settlement in A and trading in A but higher costs for the other links, is depicted in ﬁgure
2.
We focus our analysis on these changes in eﬃciency in the interaction between ex-
changes and settlement organizations. Settlement and trading price setting in the verti-
cally integrated organization are undertaken separately. That is, we neglect one beneﬁt
of vertical integration in our set-up in which settlement providers exert market power:
the internalization of the external eﬀect of the pricing decision of the trading entity on
settlement (the double marginalization eﬀect) as well as the other way round (settle-
ment in A could charge prices in order to strategically aﬀect the competition between
the trading platforms). This is, from our point of view justiﬁed by two arguments. First,
the implementation of an integrated decision process requires a proper transfer pricing
system, which is often quite cumbersome. Second, the eﬀects of the internalization pro-
10cess are quite obvious and very well investigated (see e.g. Tirole (1988), p. 174 ﬀ.): they
clearly favor vertical integration. Thereby, by neglecting this eﬀect we bias against vertical
integration, a fact which should be kept in mind when interpreting our results.
cS − y
cS + y cS + y
cS
cS + y
cS
cS
cS + y
cS
TA
TB TC
SA
SB SC
Figure 2: Vertical Integration
In order to avoid a more cumbersome technical discussion, we proceed as follows. We
concentrate on the symmetric case in which an equal number of securities are listed on the
three exchanges (ni = 1
3). We investigate vertical integration and ask for the comparative
static eﬀects. For example, does an increase in the liquidity parameter k increase or
decrease the incentives for vertical integration?
For the symmetric case we derive the proﬁt-maximizing trading and settlement prices
for A (the prices for B and C can be stated correspondingly). This gives us the subse-
quent reaction functions for i,j,l = {A,B,C} and i  = j  = l (see the Appendix for the
derivation)
p
T
i =
1
2
c
T +
1
12
t+
1
4
V +
1
8
(p
T
j +p
T
l )−
1
8
p
S
ii −
3
16
(p
S
ji+p
S
li)+
1
16
(p
S
ij + p
S
il +p
S
jj +p
S
ll) (10)
and
p
S
ii =
1
2
c
S
ii +
1
2
k +
1
6
t −
1
2
p
T
i +
1
4
(p
T
j + p
T
l )+
1
2
(p
S
ij + p
S
il) −
1
4
(c
S
ij + c
S
il) (11)
p
S
ij =
1
2
c
S
ij −
1
6
k +
1
18
t +
1
6
p
T
i −
1
2
p
T
j +
1
3
p
S
ii −
1
6
c
S
ii +
1
3
V (12)
11It is important to note that corresponding prices are strategic substitutes (see Bu-
low, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) for the concept), i.e. ∂pT
A/∂pS
jA < 0 ∀j and
∂pS
Ai/∂pT
i < 0 ∀i. Hence, price increases by the settlement provider (to either trading
platform) induce the trading platform to lower its price strategically. This mechanism
will turn out to be important in our further analysis. While prices of corresponding up-
or downstream activities are strategic substitutes, the prices of the competitors on the
trading level are strategic complements, i.e. ∂pT
A/∂pT
j > 0 ∀j  = i. Increases in prices of the
competitors lead to strategic price increases, i.e., reaction functions are upward sloping.
This pattern depicts the conventional feature of the Salop model. Further, we should note
that changes in the prices charged by settlement providers to trading platforms B and C
lead to a price increase on trading platform A, i.e. ∂pT
A/∂pS
ij < 0 ∀ia n dj= B,C.
On the settlement level, the CSDs do not compete with each other at all but the
prices set to the diﬀerent trading levels interact with each other. All these interactions
are decisive in our analysis of the vertical integration process.
Overall, we have twelve ﬁrst order conditions (3 trading prices and 1 settlement prices
for each trading platform) that we need to solve simultaneously. By doing this, we ﬁnd
(all proofs are delegated to the Appendix):
Lemma 1 Vertical integration leads to a decrease in all trading prices. This eﬀect is less
pronounced in the integrated exchange A as compared to the non-integrated exchanges
B and C. With settlement, only the services provided via the direct, more eﬃcient link
become cheaper, while all other settlement services become more expensive.
The somewhat surprising result of the eﬀect of vertical integration on relative trading
prices stems from the fact that direct trading and settlement prices are strategic substi-
tutes (see Eqs.(10)-(12)): higher settlement prices lead trading platforms to reduce their
trading prices. Hence, platforms B and C that face higher settlement prices for securities
listed on A have an incentive to reduce their price. Given that trading prices are strate-
gic complements this triggers a reduction in A’s trading price. This is reinforced by the
marginal weighted increase in settlement prices that leads, given that they are strategic
substitutes to A’s trading price, to a decrease in A’s trading price as well.
A further channel through which vertical integration aﬀects the payoﬀs of all agents
is the impact of vertical integration on traders’ behavior and market coverage. We ﬁnd:
Lemma 2
(i) Market coverage of securities listed on all platforms decrease.
(ii) The vertically integrated platform A wins trades vis-a-vis platforms B and C in
securities listed on A while losing trades for securities listed on B and C.
12The decreased coverage of the market (part (i) of the Lemma) stems from the fact
that the sum of trading and settlement prices, which traders located between B and C
have to pay, increases. Part (ii) of the above Lemma is due to the fact that, via vertical
integration, cross-platform links become more costly; hence making the respective ”home”
platform more competitive.
By using our ﬁndings on prices and quantities allows us (see the Appendix) to derive
the proﬁt diﬀerence of the sum of the proﬁts in trading and settlement in A:
Δ(π
S
A + π
T
A)=y
198900k + 8476t − 173472v + 278409y
608400t
≡ yΓ (13)
Using this expression allows us to compute comparative static eﬀects. We ﬁnd:
Proposition 1 Vertical integration is more likely to pay oﬀ if
• demand for liquidity is high (∂Γ/∂k > 0),
• eﬃciency gains via vertical integration are pronounced (∂Γ/∂y > 0),a n d
• the gains from trade are low (∂Γ/∂v < 0).
• The eﬀect of more integrated ﬁnancial markets is ambiguous: if the liquidity eﬀect
k and/or the eﬃciency gains are relatively large compared to v, a higher degree
of integration increases the proﬁtability of vertical integration and vice versa for a
relatively small k and y.
The intuition behind these ﬁndings is as follows. The more liquidity matters, the higher
the share of trades kept safe in CSD A being traded on platform A using the eﬃcient link.
The more important the liquidity eﬀect is, the larger the share of trades of a particular
security taking place on the platform on which this particular security is listed and kept
safe, respectively. Hence, the absolute and relative cost advantage of vertical integration
is most pronounced.
The fact that more pronounced eﬃciency gains make vertical integration more attrac-
tive is due to the circumstance that trades on platform A take place relatively more often
with securities listed on platform A relative to those listed on platforms B and C. Hence,
absolutely more trades are settled via the eﬃcient link in our symmetric setting. If this
link becomes even more eﬃcient (larger y), then it makes vertical integration even more
attractive.
Higher gains from trade lead to more trades on B and C of securities kept safe in A and
vice versa. These trades are settled through the ineﬃcient link after vertical integration.
Hence, since these trades increase absolutely and relatively with higher gains from trade,
this makes vertical integration less attractive.
13The eﬀect of less integrated ﬁnancial markets (higher t) is ambiguous and depends on
k and v. If the liquidity eﬀect k is relatively large compared to the gains from trade, a
higher t decreases the proﬁtability of vertical integration (∂Γ/∂t > 0 ) and vice versa.
The intuition behind this is as follows. Assume for the beginning small eﬃciency gains
(y → 0). The demand via the ineﬃcient link, either from CSD A to exchange B/C or from
exchange A to CSD B/C, increases in v (more trades from the backyard) but decreases
in k (less trades in competition area with home market). In contrast, the demand via
the eﬃcient link is independent of v but increases in k. An increasing t now reduces
the inﬂuence of k as well as of v. Therefore, if k is compared to v relatively large, an
increasing t increases the demand via the ineﬃcient links (protection from the liquidity
disadvantage), but decreases it if k is relatively small (loss of consumer to the backyards
dominates). In contrast, the demand via the eﬃcient link always decreases in t. Summing
up these eﬀects, relatively more trades are processed over the ineﬃcient link and the
gains of integration decrease while the diﬀerentiation increases if k is relatively large.
Furthermore, the impact of the size of the eﬃciency gain y has the same direction as k; y
inﬂuences the number of additional trades via the eﬃcient link. The larger t, the smaller
is the eﬀect of this competitive advantage.
A remaining, but important issue is whether a positive proﬁt diﬀerence (i.e. positive
Γ) is indeed feasible. In addition, we now address the question how vertical integration,
if it is indeed attractive, aﬀects the payoﬀs of the other agents (i.e., proﬁts for the other
platform, consumer surplus, as well as overall welfare).
Figure 3 displays Eq.(13), as well as our Assumptions 1 and 2 on the parameters (the
grey area is not compatible with these assumptions), in k
t − v
t space. Besides reﬂecting the
results of Proposition 1 once again, it clearly shows that vertical integration can indeed
pay oﬀ. The white range in the ﬁgure displays the parameter combinations that are not
only feasible but also increase the sum of proﬁts of A with vertical integration even if the
marginal eﬃciency eﬀect is evaluated at y =0 . 4
4An obvious limitation to our analysis so far is our symmetry assumption. We argue, however, that
relaxing this assumption does not change our qualitative analysis so far. We do this by proving that
locally (i.e., at nA =1 /3) the proﬁt diﬀerence is always strictly increasing in nA. Taking the ﬁrst order
derivative of the proﬁt diﬀerence with respect to nA gives us (see the Appendix for a derivation of this):
∂Δ(πS
A + πT
A)nA=1/3
∂nA
= y
2405520k + 785876t− 47892v + 2965353y
5272800t
> 0.
The positive sign of this expression follows from our assumptions stated above.
Investigating this relation not only locally but for diﬀerent nA we are unable to provide a general proof,
but can argue on the basis of a large number of numerical exercises that the sign of Eq. (4) when mapped
onto the size of platform A (i.e. nA) is indeed positive implying a rising incentive to vertically integrate
with size. This is quite reasonable. The larger a trading platform is, ie., the more securities are listed on
it, the more (less) trades are settled via the (in-) eﬃcient link, hence making vertical integration more
attractive.
14Figure 3: Eﬀect of vertical integration on proﬁt of A
As a next step, we consider the eﬀects of the vertical integration of platform A on
the other players in the market. Thereby, we are able to gain insights into the potential
externalities vertical integration imposes on other market participants. These other market
participants are the competitors of platform A (trading and settlement platforms B and
C) as well as the traders in the markets. We pursue our analysis in this order.
The corresponding proﬁt diﬀerence for platforms B and C reads as:
Δ(π
S
q + π
T
q )=y
105300k − 36868t − 215904v + 172233y
1216800t
. (14)
Given our assumptions for the feasible parameter range (which imply that v>0.5t>
0.5k), it immediately becomes clear that the proﬁt diﬀerential is always negative for
suﬃciently small eﬃciency gains (e.g., y approaching zero). Despite the fact that B and
C gain via less intense competition, they loose traders with respect to securities listed on
platform A to trading platform A and to the non-trading camp. Overall this leads to a
decrease in proﬁts. Hence, A’s vertical integration decision imposes a negative externality
on A’s competitors.
Computing the diﬀerence eﬀect of vertical integration on the well-being of traders
yields a surplus for traders (see the Appendix for details of the computation)
ΔTradersSurplus = y
152100k + 7436t − 129792v + 203289y
608400t
. (15)
Pretty much the same mechanisms apply as with Proposition 1. A more pronounced
liquidity eﬀect and a lower net social reservation price lead to relatively more trades via
15the eﬃcient link. Securities listed on exchange A are more often traded on this platform.
The traders gain via lower prices through which settlement providers channel eﬃciency
gains to traders. Figure 4 shows that traders – in sum – may indeed gain from vertical
integration absolutely. This gain implies that in our symmetric setting the gains of the
traders who beneﬁt from the standardization of the vertically integrated exchange (i.e.,
those having a preference to trade on exchange A) outweigh the losses of traders who have
a preference for other exchanges.
Figure 4: Eﬀect of vertical integration on traders’ surplus
4.1.2 Vertical integration if everybody else is
One of the main aims of this paper is to shed light on industry dynamics and the evolution
of the trading and settlement industry. Against this background, it is important to inves-
tigate to what extent the incentives to integrate vertically hinge on the existing industry
structure. Or in a nutshell: is vertical integration more or less attractive if competitors
are already integrated or not?
We start out by looking into the incentives for A to vertically integrate if one of the
other platforms (say B) is already vertically integrated. This situation implies that the
already vertically integrated platform not only has established an eﬃcient link in B but
has build up ineﬃcient links with A and C. Hence, the vertical integration process only
adds an eﬃcient link to A and an ineﬃcient to C (rather than with B and C as in our
previous). Somewhat surprisingly, we ﬁnd:
16Proposition 2
(i) Vertical integration is privately more attractive if all other platforms are already
vertically integrated as compared to a situation in which the other platforms are not
yet vertically integrated.
(ii) There might exist a coordination problem: if one platform vertically integrates all
others have an incentive to follow despite the fact that platform proﬁts may be lower
in the new equilibrium.
The intuitive explanation behind part (i) of Proposition 2 can be best understood by
noting that the integration of one platform (say B) implies that the beneﬁts for A stem-
ming from its own integration increase. After the integration of B, A faces a competitor
with an eﬃcient link; hence, making it more attractive to establish an eﬃcient link on its
own as well. Furthermore, after B’s integration, there is already an ineﬃcient link between
A and B thereby eliminating these additional costs for A’s integration. Taking these two
eﬀects together makes A’s integration more attractive after B’s integration compared to
the situation in which A goes for a head start with respect to vertical integration.
Obviously, given A and B decide to integrate, C follows. Therefore, we observe a
bandwagon eﬀect. If one exchange decides to integrate, the others follow. This eﬀect also
means that, say for historical reasons the exchange and the respective CSD are integrated
in country A, the probability that the ﬁnancial-security service providers in country B
and C decide to do the same is high.
This bandwagon eﬀect might be associated with a coordination problem. In other
words, we ﬁnd situations where it is advantageous for one exchange to integrate but then
the others follow and in the end they are all worse oﬀ. Graphically, we can illustrate these
parameter constellations in ﬁgure 5 where the dark grey shaded area is the parameter
region where we observe a prisoner’s dilemma.
This potentially excessive degree of vertical integration (from the viewpoint of the plat-
forms only) stems from the fact that vertical integration comes with negative externalities
imposed on the other platforms as we have argued above.
4.2 Welfare consequences of vertical integration
In the next step, we aim to investigate the overall welfare consequences of vertical inte-
gration. As before, we distinguish between two settings. In the ﬁrst one, only platform A
is vertically integrated at the end (stand-alone case). In the second one, all platforms are
integrated at the end (full integration).
17Figure 5: Eﬀect of vertical integration of all ﬁnancial-security service provider on proﬁts
4.2.1 Stand-alone case
Our discussion above indicates that moving platform A towards vertical integration when
the others are not integrated imposes a negative externality on A’s competitors and a
positive one on traders.
The overall diﬀerence in welfare (i.e., taking the sum of all proﬁts and trader surplus)
in the stand-alone case amounts to
ΔWelfare= y
456300k − 20956t − 519168v + 653931y
608400t
. (16)
We ﬁnd
Proposition 3 With stand-alone integration the negative externality on competing plat-
forms exceeds the positive impact on traders, hence, leading to potentially excessive vertical
integration.
Because platform A does not internalize the impact of its integration decisions, it has,
in total, much stronger incentives to vertically integrate than a social planner.
Figure 6 illustrates this ﬁnding. It shows that vertical integration might improve overall
welfare in our symmetric setting. But the comparison with ﬁgure 3 discloses that there
exists a parameter region in which private and social incentives diverge. This parameter
region is characterized by intermediate levels of the liquidity parameter and the gains
from trade.
18Figure 6: Eﬀect of vertical integration on total welfare
4.2.2 Full integration
This excessive integration scenario is caused by the negative externality eﬀect imposed
by platform A on other exchanges in the stand-alone case. The negative externality itself
stems from the fact that vertical integration in the stand-alone case reduces costs for A but
increases those for B and C. However, if these other two platforms are already vertically
integrated, this latter eﬀect is absent and only the cost-reducing eﬀect that aﬀects B and
C’s proﬁts exists. Hence, negative externalities are clearly lower. In turn, because there
is only a cost-reducing eﬀect, the positive externality on traders is higher. Therefore, one
might conjecture, that the positive externality dominates the negative one, leading to net
positive externalities and therefore to too few incentives to vertically integrate.
We therefore compare situations with or without full-scale integration from a welfare
as well as from a private point-of-view.
The overall welfare eﬀect is expressed by
ΔWelfare= y
225k +1 1 t − 192v + 321y
150t
. (17)
This eﬀect shows us that, compared to the situation of A-integration for a larger set
of parameters, welfare increases (see Eq. (7)), thereby conﬁrming our above conjecture
among other things.
In order to ﬁnd out whether private incentives to start the process of vertical integra-
tion are in line with the social ones to achieve full integration, we have to compare Eqs.
19Figure 7: Eﬀect of vertical integration of all ﬁnancial-security service provider on welfare
(13) and (17) with each other (or in graphical terms ﬁgures 7 and 3).5
By doing so, we ﬁnd:
Proposition 4 While the process towards full integration via the bandwagon eﬀect might
be harmful to platforms, this integration process leading to full integration is beneﬁcial for
society.
5 Horizontal integration
Given network economies as well as economies of scale and scope, horizontal integration is
an alternative to vertical integration that is intensively and hotly discussed in the ﬁnancial
press (see Economist (2006)). Therefore, we consider horizontal integration for its own sake
but also in comparison to vertical integration. In our framework, horizontal integration of
trading platforms for matters of the exploitation of liquidity and network eﬀects leads to a
joint trading platform that eliminates the limited access of certain traders to certain stocks
and, thus, to the coverage gap in our base model. In a nutshell, horizontal integration of
trading platforms changes the market structure at the trading level and, therefore, the
entire model structure, which makes a comparison with vertical integration infeasible. In
order to avoid this problem, we consider horizontal integration at the settlement level. At
5Due to the bandwagon eﬀect, we know that, if starting the vertical integration process on a stand-
alone basis, it will ﬁnally lead to full integration. Therefore, the private incentives as expressed in Eq.
(13) are the right measure of comparison.
20this level, horizontal integration leaves market structure unchanged, and the settlement
providers stay in their monopolistic situation.
To capture the concept of network eﬀects as well as of economies of scope at the clearing
and settlement level, we model horizontal integration as cost savings, b· y (0 <b<1), of
all settlement provider. So, while trading platforms’ costs amount to cT,t h ec o s t so fa l l
settlement provider are cS − by.
Given that the monopolistic settlement provider all experience identical cost savings,
their monopolistic proﬁts increase. Since there are only gains but no costs to horizontal
integration, this is quite clear. Rather than introducing the costs of integration as a
countervailing balance we pursue what we consider a much more interesting alternative:
to compare the incentives to integrate horizontally with those of vertical integration.
In a ﬁrst step we compare, from the viewpoint of individual ﬁrms, the gains from hori-
zontal integration with the potential gains from vertical integration in one platform given
that all other platforms are vertically nonintegrated. This basically depicts a situation
with the very same starting point in which a settlement provider can either decide to
vertically integrate with the corresponding trading platform or join forces with the other
settlement providers to integrate horizontally. Since there is no reason in our model to stop
short of integrating all three settlement providers, we equate horizontal integration with
the integration of all three rather than only two settlement providers, a procedure which
aﬀects our comparison quantitatively but not qualitatively. Furthermore, given that our
previous discussion has shown that stand-alone vertical integration requires higher incen-
tives than the vertical integration decision where others are already vertically integrated,
this comparison allows a prediction on the ﬁnal equilibrium starting from a situation of
complete nonintegration.
In a second step we compare the private incentives for horizontal or vertical integration
with the optimal decision rule in which the central planner compares horizontal integration
with full-sized vertical integration. With this second step, we examine whether it might
be feasible for the market solution to end up in a bad equilibrium due to a coordination
problem with settlement and trading platforms.
5.1 Horizontal vs. Vertical Integration - Private Incentives
By using the proﬁt-maximizing prices together with the demand functions in the proﬁt
functions allows us to derive the following proﬁt diﬀerence for all settlement providers,
i.e., the sum of settlement providers’ proﬁts after horizontal integration minus the one
before integration (see the Appendix for details):
Δ(π
s
A + π
s
B + π
s
C)=8 by
2t +6 v +3 by
75t
. (18)
21Subtracting this expression from the proﬁt diﬀerence resulting from vertical integration
(see Eq. (13)) yields
ΣProfits = y
198900k + 8476t − 173472v + 278409y − 64896b(2t +6 v +3 by)
608400t
. (19)
We interpret this expression as the diﬀerential incentives for one settlement provider to
choose horizontal rather than vertical integration.
Checking for the sign of Eq. (19) and solving for the critical b, which just leads to
indiﬀerence between vertical and horizontal integration (at y = 0) yields
b
∗ =
198900k + 8476t − 173472v
64896(2t +6 v)
. (20)
Given our assumptions, b∗ is always smaller than one, which is a rather intuitive result.
With b = 1, all settlement providers face eﬃcient links with horizontal integration; but,
with vertical integration, the integrating platform has to tradeoﬀ the direct eﬃcient link
for the indirect ineﬃcient link. The cost disadvantage of the ineﬃcient link outweighes
the competitive advantage that the other settlement providers have and deters them from
relying on the ineﬃcient links as well. Overall, this implies that with b =1h o r i z o n t a l
integration dominates vertical integration.
We ﬁnd:
Proposition 5 Private Perspective: Vertical integration (on a stand-alone basis) be-
comes more attractive for a single platform relative to horizontal integration if
• the liquidity eﬀect is more pronounced (∂b∗/∂k > 0),
• and the gains of trade becomes larger (∂b∗/∂v > 0).
• The eﬀect of more closely integrated ﬁnancial markets is ambiguous (∂b∗/∂t > 0 for
v>kand vice versa).
The intuition is rather similar to Proposition 1. With vertical integration, a more
pronounced liquidity eﬀect shifts more trades into the settlement via the eﬃcient link.
This shift has a positive eﬀect on the proﬁts of the integrated platform making vertical
integration relative to horizontal integration more attractive. In contrast, with horizontal
integration all settlement links become cheaper to the same extent. Hence, a change in
the market shares of the diﬀerent trading platforms does not aﬀect proﬁts in the case
of horizontal integration, which leaves no room for an eﬀect of k on the incentive to
horizontally integrate. Compared to Proposition 1, horizontal integration as an alternative
adds an additional disadvantage to vertical integration that grows with the size of the
gains from trades.
22The eﬀect of the ﬁnancial market-integration parameter t is ambiguous. A lower degree
of integration (larger t) decreases the proﬁtability of horizontal integration, because less
additional trader are won. In contrast, we know from Proposition 1, that if k is relatively
large an increasing t decreases the proﬁtability of vertical integration. In sum, we still get
the ambiguity, with a slightly diﬀerent parameter condition. The liquidity eﬀect needs to
be larger compared to Proposition 1 to receive the decreasing pattern of b∗.
5.2 Horizontal vs. Vertical Integration - Social Incentives
We now turn to the evaluation of diﬀerent industry equilibriums (with either full horizontal
or full vertical integration) from a welfare point of view, and the private incentives to
reach these equilibriums (remember: if a ﬁnancial-security service provider in one country
decides to integrate the others will follow). We especially examine whether there is a
potential coordination eﬀect in the sense that it is socially feasible to have full-scale
vertical integration when private incentives stand in the way of a headstart such that
initial horizontal integration is preferred despite the fact that in the end the latter is
socially dominant.
The private incentives to reach either of the two industry equilibriums has been in-
vestigated above (see Eq. (20)). Hence, we need to evaluate full-scale vertical integration
(embracing all three platforms) and horizontal integration from a welfare point of view.
Computing the relative gains in welfare accruing from full-scale vertical versus horizontal
integration gives us:
ΣWelfare = y
225k +1 1 t − 192v + 321y − 32b(2t +6 v +3 by)
150t
(21)
which, if positive, implies that vertical integration dominates horizontal integration from
a welfare point of view.
Evaluated at y = 0 this yields the critical social b∗
fs:
b
∗
fs =
225k +1 1 t − 192v
32(2t +6 v)
. (22)
As the next step, we compare the private incentives for reaching either equilibrium
with the relative advantages of either equilibrium from a social point of view. When
comparing b∗ with b∗
fs we ﬁnd
sign (b
∗
fs − b
∗)=s i g n (
257400k + 13832t − 215905v
64896(2t +6 v)
).
Figure 5.2 depicts these diﬀerences and distinguishes between the two cases in which
these diﬀerences are positive (lower part) or negative (upper part).
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Figure 8: Private vs social incentives
Hence, we ﬁnd:
Proposition 6 Social vs private perspective: With strong (weak) liquidity eﬀects and
weak (strong) social net reservation prices, the industry might end up in a bad equilibrium
in which settlement providers are horizontally (vertically) integrated.
To better understand the economic intuition behind this result it is important to notice
that vertical integration as well as horizontal integration imposes an positive externality
on traders. The externality of vertical integration increases with the importance of liq-
uidity, and more important it increases overproportionally to the proﬁt diﬀerence of an
individual CSD/exchange. Strong liquidity eﬀects imply that a relatively large share of
trades take place via the eﬃcient link while relatively few trades take place via the inef-
ﬁcient link. Hence, traders beneﬁt relatively more, while the other ﬁrms loose relatively
less. The opposite is true for the gains from trade, the externality decreases with gains
overproportionally to the individual proﬁt. In contrast, the private and social incentives
for horizontal integration increase (decrease) proportional to each other. In sum, a social
planer demands a larger cost saving from horizontal integration than an individual CSD
if the importance of liquidity is high. Less integrated ﬁnancial markets decrease the im-
portance of the liquidity as well as of the gains from trade. It therefore depends on the
relative importance of these parameters.
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6.1 Endogenous Listings
So far our analysis has been undertaken against the background of a given distribution
of listings of securities across the trading platforms. We proceed by thinking about endo-
genizing the listings of securities. In order to endogenize the listing decision, it is crucial
to think about the objective function behind this listing decision. There are two obvious
factors determining the listing decision, the ﬁrst one being the costs of the listing consist-
ing of direct ones (paid to the trading platform) and indirect ones (costs of reporting and
disclosing information and the like). The second factor, which is potentially of much more
importance for the listing decision is the degree of access to capital markets. This latter ef-
fect is strongly aﬀected by the size and liquidity of the respective trading platform. Firms
setting up a listing are especially interested in reaching a wide range of potential investors
for a security. This range provides them with immediate investors in the primary market
with a broader subsequent market making the initial investment more attractive. Hence,
initial investors are willing to pay higher prices leading to a lower degree of underpricing.
Furthermore, a broader set of investors facilitates subsequent (seasoned) oﬀerings.
In our model, the number of investors reached equals the market coverage. Thus, we
consider the listing decision as the outcome of a cost-beneﬁt trade-oﬀ in which the price
paid is contrasted with the gain that accrues from the investors for its security that the
company/organization listing reaches. We therefore depict the objective function as
Πf = a ∗ coverage − p
T
L − p
S
L − lf (23)
with coverage denoting the market reach of the security, and pi
L the price to be be paid to
the trading/settlement platform. Parameter a stands for the importance of the coverage
and lf is a diﬀerentiation parameter of a ﬁrm f. Such a diﬀerentiation, which seems to
be relevant as it is rather uncommon that ﬁrms choose a primary listing abroad (at least
for ﬁrms in developed countries), correspond to t of the former sections and therefore
decreases also with more integrated ﬁnancial markets.
One may think of the listing decision as a two-stage game. In stage 1, exchanges set
listing fees and ﬁrms decide about their listing venue. In stage 2, exchanges and CSDs
set their trading and settlement fees and traders decide if and where to trade. Reasoning
backwards shows two results. First, listings are very important for exchanges and CSDs
since they are absolutely necessary for CSD business and because they oﬀer a competitive
advantage via the liquidity (or expectations) eﬀect for exchanges. This eﬀect should lead
to an incentive for the exchange to ”buy in” this market side and result in rather ”low”
listing fees.
25In addition, ﬁrms anticipate their market coverage on the respective trading venue and
a comparably smaller potential coverage can be oﬀset by lower listing fees. Therefore, since
vertical integration aﬀects the market coverage negatively, an integrated exchange has to
reduce pi
L in order to avoid loosing listed securities. This observation adds an additional
disadvantage to vertical integration from an exchange perspective that is ceteris paribus
larger the higher the weight of coverage, i.e., the larger a. In contrast, the disadvantage
is smaller the lower the degree of ﬁnancial market integration from the view of the ﬁrms,
i.e., the larger lf.
Table 1 compares the listing and admission fees of Deutsche B¨ orse as the European
exchange with the highest degree of vertical integration and the LSE as the one with the
lowest degree. These fees can be interpreted as an initial rough indication towards our
hypothesis that vertically integrated exchanges indeed demand lower listing fees.
Deutsche B¨ orse London Stock Exchange
Admission Fees 750 - 5,500 e 9,508 - 230,565 e
Listing Fees 5,000 - 10,000 e 5,211 - 19,453 e
Table 1: Admission and Listing Fees for ordinary shares depending on market segment
and market cap. (Source: Kaserer and Schiereck (2008))
6.2 OTC Trading
The alternative to trading on exchanges is bilateral OTC trading. In OTC transactions
traders privately negotiate the individual conditions of a trade. Because the terms and
conditions are private information, the liquidity eﬀect becomes irrelevant. The advantage
of OTC compared to trades on exchanges is, on the one hand, the possibility to trade
non-standardized contracts that can be tailored to the needs of the trading partners.
On the other hand, OTC trading fails to keep the trade secret implying that it has no
impact on the market price and hence on the value of the trading positions. The obvious
disadvantage stems from the fact that there is less liquidity in the market requiring a need
for a trading partner.
OTC trading inﬂuences the integration decision of traditional exchanges via two poten-
tial mechanisms. First, assume OTC trading is not a substitute for trading on exchanges.
In order to settle OTC trades, traders also need a link to the corresponding CSD. In
case of a vertically integrated CSD, such a link is out of the vertical system and thus
”ineﬃcient”. Therefore the larger OTC markets a larger fraction of trades is settled via
the ineﬃcient link. If demand elasticity is ﬁnite, the integrated exchange is not able to
transfer the increased costs fully to traders, which implies a reduction in the exchange’s
proﬁts. Hence, the larger the OTC market, the less attractive vertical integration is for
26the exchanges as well as for the welfare of the society (since it as a whole has to carry the
additional costs). A second eﬀect arises if we consider the possibility that OTC trading is
a substitute for exchange trading. Through vertical integration the cost of OTC trading
could be raised, and, therefore, vertical integration can be a mechanism for a competitive
advantage. Thus, for a given size of the OTC market, a higher degree of substitutability of
the trading services between exchanges and OTC trading implies that vertical integration
becomes more advantageous.
7 Discussion
7.1 Multilateral Trading Facilities
In recent years a large number of so called Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) have
emerged. These MTFs oﬀer trading services in various ways. While some operate systems
similar to traditional exchanges for special asset classes, others operate specialized sys-
tems as dark pools that do not quote realized prices. But all MTFs share one common
characteristic: They do not oﬀer listing services.
We interpret the emergence of MTFs in a similar way to OTC trading. MTFs are an
additional alternative for trading that also needs a link to the CSDs, an ineﬃcient one
in the case of an integrated exchange. The introduction of MTFs has had three eﬀects.
First, it creates new trading activity, e.g., through faster systems. This activity lowers
the attractiveness of vertical integration because the number of trades via the ineﬃcient
link increases. Second, it brings former bilateral OTC trading to more eﬃcient centralized
platforms and, third, substitutes away trading activity from traditional exchanges. In
contrast to the ﬁrst eﬀect, these two latter eﬀects may have increased the attractiveness
of vertical integration. MTFs are still imperfect substitutes to exchanges but presumably
closer to formal exchanges than simple OTC trading. The larger degree of substitutability
with exchange services increases the relevance of costs. Therefore, increasing the costs of
the rivals raises the possibility of deterring entry. Looking at the market shares in table
2, this view seems to be supported by some initial empirical indications. Deutsche B¨ orse,
the more vertically integrated exchange, lost less market shares to new MTFs compared
to the London Stock Exchange.
DAX 30 FTSE 100
Market Share of MTFs 23 percent 32 percent
Table 2: Market Share of MTFs6 in DAX 30 and FTSE 100 shares 2009. (Source: BATS
Europe Website)
6BATS, Chi-X, Nasdaq OMX Europe MTF, and Turquoise.
27We also would like to stress another point that indicates that the underlying mecha-
nisms in our model are in line with the stylized facts observed in this respect. Given the
demand for liquidity and due to the fact that MTFs do not oﬀer listing services, there is
a priori no reason why the market should expect many people to trade any asset on their
platforms; except one, lower prices. Indeed, we observe signiﬁcantly lower trading prices
with MTFs as compared to incumbent exchanges.
The emergence of MTFs raises a number of further issues. In order to be able to
compete with the traditional exchanges MTFs have been very innovative in bypassing
the expectation or liquidity advantage of the exchanges. They try to coordinate major
players in the market on their platform, e.g. Turquoise, or introduce new pricing schemes
like Maker-Taker pricing. Maker-Taker pricing schemes pay for every Limit-Order (e.g.,
an order that is contingent on a speciﬁc price, which therefore ”makes” liquidity) and
bill for every Market-Order (e.g., an order to buy/sell at the best available price, which
therefore ”takes” liquidity). In sum, the trading platforms earn a positive amount.
When they succeed in capturing the largest part of the liquidity, new questions about
the industry structure arise. The listing entity will then be uncoupled with the trading
platform. Traditional exchanges may then become a simple listing (or rating) agency and
the prices for IPOs will potentially rise.
7.2 Algo-Trading
Algorithmic trading (AT) has increased greatly in the recent past. The typical deﬁnition
for AT is the automatic trading of ﬁnancial assets on the basis of computer algorithms.
Behind this broad deﬁnition, a wide variety of diﬀerent algorithmic patterns, such as
statistical algorithms based on statistical arbitrage or splitting large orders into small
ones, exist in the data (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011)).
Since the 1990s it is possible to observe a correlation between this type of trading
and increased liquidity. But since AT is a supplier of liquidity as well as a demander of
liquidity, the net eﬀect is not a priori clear. In a recent study, Hendershott, Jones, and
Menkveld (2011), however, provide clear empirical evidence for a positive causal eﬀect
for AT on liquidity. They ﬁnd that for large stocks in particular, AT reduces spreads and
therefore beneﬁts other non AT traders as well.
Because AT is present on a multiplicity of trading platforms, we interpret this as
a reduction of the liquidity advantage of the home market (e.g., a reduction in k, i.e.,
less desire by traders for liquidity, harms primary markets, by the way, a fact which is
correlated with the rise of AT) and, hence, makes vertical integration less appealing. With
al o w e rk more trades take place via the eﬃcient links and more so via ineﬃcient ones. This
eﬀect is especially pronounced where AT is most prevalent, namely in large stocks. That
28ﬁnding implies that due to the rise of AT exchanges that are in particular specialized in
equity markets and even more so in large stocks have less incentives to vertically integrate.
7.3 TARGET2-Securities
TARGET2-Securities are an initiative by the Eurosystem with the objective of establish-
ing an IT-platform that oﬀers harmonized and central settlement services. This platform
divides the settlement process from the other CSD services, e.g., safe-keeping. By con-
necting all involved CSDs, the main aim is to reduce the barriers and costs of cross-border
trades.
In our model, TARGET2-Securities ﬁt the horizontal integration case. All systems
become compatible to each other and, hence, economies of scale and scope decrease the
costs of settling trades. We interpret the fact that the Eurosystem, as a system of public
entities, promotes such a system as a reaction on the perceived divergence of private
and social incentives for vertical/horizontal integration. Given our results in Proposition
6 private actors opt for excessive vertical integration if the importance of liquidity is
relatively weak. Thus, the move of the Eurosystem is justiﬁed against the background of
our model, if the importance of liquidity over all asset classes is relatively weak and/or will
decrease in the future. This seems to be the case as we have outlined in the former sections
that some major industry trends, like the emergence of Algo-Trading and Multilateral
Trading Facilities that include Maker-Taker Pricing, decrease the importance of liquidity.
A presumably further declining k makes horizontal integration therefore more desirable
from a social point-of-view.
8C o n c l u s i o n
We consider the main contribution of this paper is to shed light on the inter-relation be-
tween the choice of organizational design and competition in the ﬁnancial-security service
industry. In order to do so we have developed a stylized model of the ﬁnancial-security ser-
vice industry. The key feature of the model is the competition among three diﬀerentiated
exchanges (upstream producers) which each build on the services of the respective settle-
ment providers (downstream producers). The latter act as monopolists since settlement
is linked one-to-one to the platform where the listing of the ﬁnancial security has taken
place. A key advantage of the ”home” exchange is delineated in the liquidity eﬀect which
states traders’ preferences for liquidity on a single platform. The liquidity eﬀect as well
as the degree of diﬀerentiation among exchanges together with the social net reservation
price are the key drivers in our model. In this framework, vertical integration is considered
as establishing a closed technological standard which allows for speciﬁc linkages between
29up- and downstream producer.
The main empirical predictions of our analysis are that we should expect to see less
rather than more vertical integration if further real integration, e.g., in the European
Union, prevails and cross-border trades become more attractive for investors. In addition,
we should observe more vertical integration of exchanges which are relying on trading
assets where the liquidity eﬀect plays a crucial role (e.g. in stocks). Finally we stress
the possibility of market failure and coordination problems among ﬁrms associated with
the vertical integration decision process. We argue that this may lead to an equilibrium
with excessive vertical integration from of social point of view but also from the ﬁrms’
perspective.
Despite the fact that we have focused our analysis on ﬁnancial-security service providers,
we think a number of our insights can be applied to other network industries; such as the
railway industry, the gas industry, etc. Adopting our framework to other industries should
allow us to approach questions of organizational design such as the question of whether the
network infrastructure should be closely aligned with one upstream ﬁrm or be operated
independently.
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Derivation of price reaction functions and proof of Lemma 1
In order to derive the proﬁt-maximizing trading and settlement prices we plug in the
demand functions in Eq. (8) as well as in Eq. (9) and take ﬁrst-order derivatives with
respect to prices. This procedure yields 12 reaction functions, for trading platform i,j,l =
{A,B,C} we ﬁnd:
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A
)

33Plugging in the respective costs and ni =
1
3 yields
p
T
A =
1
5
V −
1
5
c
S +
4
5
c
T +
1
15
t −
7
65
y (35)
p
T
B = p
T
C =
1
5
V −
1
5
c
S +
4
5
c
T +
1
15
t −
19
130
y (36)
p
S
AA =
2
5
V +
3
5
c
S −
2
5
c
T +
3
10
t +
1
2
k −
29
65
y (37)
p
S
BB = p
S
CC =
2
5
V +
3
5
c
S −
2
5
c
T +
3
10
t +
1
2
k +
19
260
y (38)
p
S
AB = p
S
AC =
2
5
V +
3
5
c
S −
2
5
c
T +
2
15
t +
149
260
y (39)
p
S
BA = p
S
CA =
2
5
V +
3
5
c
S −
2
5
c
T +
2
15
t +
36
65
y (40)
p
S
BC = p
S
CB =
2
5
V +
3
5
c
S −
2
5
c
T +
2
15
t +
19
260
y (41)
These prices allow us to state Lemma 1
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e
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d
A
A
=
1
1
2
(
2
9
+
n
A
−
4
n
2
A
)

(
V
−
c
T
)
(
3
6
n
A
−
1
2
)
+
k
(
2
0
4
−
8
4
n
A
−
2
4
n
2
A
)
+
t
(
6
4
−
1
6
n
A
−
8
n
2
A
)
−
6
c
S
A
A
(
2
9
−
9
n
A
−
4
n
2
A
)
+
3
(
c
S
A
B
+
c
S
A
C
)
(
2
9
−
1
7
n
A
)
−
1
5
(
c
S
B
B
+
c
S
C
C
)
(
1
−
n
A
)
+
(
4
2
)
3
(
c
S
B
A
+
c
S
C
A
)
(
1
1
−
9
n
A
−
2
n
2
A
)
−
6
(
c
S
B
C
+
c
S
C
B
)
(
2
−
3
n
A
+
n
2
A
)
]

d
q
A
=
1
8
(
4
9
3
+
4
6
n
A
−
6
7
n
2
A
−
4
n
3
A
)

4
(
V
−
c
T
)
(
3
5
7
+
1
4
0
n
A
−
2
7
n
2
A
−
2
n
3
A
)
−
4
k
(
1
5
3
+
2
8
1
n
A
+
3
3
n
2
A
+
n
3
A
)
−
4
t
(
6
8
+
4
7
n
A
+
2
0
8
n
2
A
+
n
3
A
)
+
4
n
A
c
S
A
A
(
1
8
7
+
9
0
n
A
+
n
2
A
)
−
(
4
3
)
2
n
A
c
S
A
q
(
3
2
5
−
1
3
n
2
A
)
−
2
c
S
A
p
(
1
5
1
−
6
n
A
+
1
1
n
2
A
)
+
2
c
S
q
q
(
3
5
6
+
1
5
9
n
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−
3
8
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A
−
9
n
3
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)
−
2
c
S
p
p
(
5
0
−
2
9
n
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−
1
4
n
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A
−
7
n
3
A
)
+
1
3
c
S
q
p
(
5
−
n
A
−
5
n
2
A
+
n
3
A
)
−
c
S
q
A
(
2
4
1
9
+
6
3
1
n
A
−
2
2
3
n
2
A
−
1
9
n
3
A
)
+
1
3
c
S
p
A
(
3
7
−
2
3
n
A
−
1
3
n
2
A
+
n
3
A
)
−
c
S
p
q
(
1
6
7
−
2
1
1
n
A
+
2
5
n
2
A
+
1
9
n
3
A
)
]
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8
(
4
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4
6
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6
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−
4
n
3
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
4
(
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−
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2
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−
6
0
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3
9
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4
k
(
3
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2
1
9
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n
2
A
+
n
3
A
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+
4
t
(
3
4
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5
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1
4
n
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n
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2
c
S
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(
4
4
8
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2
6
0
n
A
−
1
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n
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−
(
4
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(
1
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4
9
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1
1
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+
3
1
n
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)
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c
S
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(
1
1
3
−
1
0
6
n
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+
2
9
1
n
2
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)
+
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c
S
q
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(
2
0
7
−
2
1
5
n
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+
1
1
n
2
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+
1
9
n
3
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)
−
2
c
S
p
p
(
5
4
−
3
7
n
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−
3
4
n
2
A
+
1
7
n
3
A
)
−
c
S
q
p
(
1
2
7
−
4
3
n
A
−
1
2
7
n
2
A
+
4
3
n
3
A
)
−
c
S
p
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(
1
5
1
−
1
5
7
n
A
+
1
7
n
2
A
−
1
1
n
3
A
)
−
1
3
c
S
q
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(
2
5
−
2
5
n
A
−
n
2
A
+
n
3
A
)
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S
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5
6
9
−
6
2
9
n
A
+
7
n
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5
3
n
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9
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
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S
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(
6
2
1
−
2
4
n
A
−
6
7
n
2
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)
−
(
4
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n
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S
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(
5
4
+
1
7
n
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−
1
7
n
2
A
)
−
c
S
q
q
(
2
4
3
9
+
7
7
4
n
A
−
3
2
7
n
2
A
−
7
8
n
3
A
)
−
6
c
S
p
p
(
4
4
−
4
3
n
A
−
1
0
n
2
A
+
9
n
3
A
)
+
3
c
S
q
p
(
3
5
3
+
1
6
5
n
A
−
2
3
n
2
A
−
2
7
n
3
A
)
−
3
c
S
p
A
(
5
0
−
2
9
n
A
−
1
4
n
2
A
−
7
n
3
A
)
+
c
S
q
A
(
3
5
6
+
1
5
9
n
A
−
3
8
n
2
A
−
9
n
3
A
)
+
c
S
p
q
(
6
2
4
−
6
5
1
n
A
−
4
8
n
2
A
+
7
5
n
3
A
)
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q
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(
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9
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4
6
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−
6
7
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2
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−
4
n
3
A
)

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V
−
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(
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0
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−
5
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1
8
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n
3
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−
2
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(
5
6
1
+
1
8
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−
2
1
n
2
A
−
2
n
3
A
)
+
2
t
(
8
5
+
6
6
n
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−
3
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2
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−
2
n
3
A
)
+
8
n
A
c
S
A
A
(
3
4
−
1
5
n
A
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n
2
A
)
+
(
4
6
)
2
n
A
c
S
A
q
(
5
6
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−
6
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−
5
3
n
2
A
)
−
2
n
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S
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(
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+
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+
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q
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−
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1
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2
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+
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2
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−
2
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−
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S
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(
3
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1
−
2
5
3
n
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−
1
1
9
n
2
A
+
6
1
n
3
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)
−
1
3
c
S
p
A
(
5
−
n
A
−
5
n
2
A
−
n
3
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)
+
c
S
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(
1
6
7
+
2
1
1
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A
+
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5
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2
A
+
1
9
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3
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+
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(
2
3
4
1
+
9
1
9
n
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−
3
6
1
n
2
A
−
9
1
n
3
A
)
]
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35Substituting these expressions into the respective expressions yields for market cov-
erage and number of traders on the respective platforms the following expressions. For
securities listed on trading platform A, traders which remain inactive for those securities
are:
1
3
− d
A
BB − d
A
CC =
286t − 312v + 333y
390t
(47)
Number of traders trading platform A for securities listed on A can be expressed as
d
A
AB + d
A
AC =
78k +2 6 t + 153y
156t
. (48)
The corresponding eﬀects for securities listed on B and C with p,q = {B,C} and
p  = q are:
1 − d
q
AA + d
q
pp =
572t − 624v + 291y
780t
(49)
for the size of the inactive traders and
d
q
qA + d
q
qp =
156k +5 2 t +8 1 y
312t
. (50)
for trades taking place on the platforms on which the securities are actually listed.
Derivation of proﬁt functions
Substituting prices and quantities into Eqs.(8) and (9) gives the relevant proﬁts and the
relevant diﬀerences follow.
36Derivation of trader surplus for the diﬀerent settings
We can express trader surplus as the sum of consumer surplus of all the diﬀerent segments:
TS = n1[
 xA
1
0
(V − p
T
A − p
S
AA + k − tx)dx +
 1
3
xA
1
(V − p
T
B − p
S
AB − t ∗ (
1
3
− x))dx + (51)
 xA
3
1
3
(V − p
T
B − p
S
AB − t(x −
1
3
)dx +
 2
3
xA
4
(V − p
T
C − p
S
AC − t(
2
3
− x)dx +
 xA
2
2
3
(V − p
T
C − p
S
AC − t(x −
2
3
)dx +

xA
2
1(V − p
T
A − p
S
AA + k − t(1 − x))dx]+
n2[
 xB
1
0
(V − p
T
A − p
S
BA − tx)dx +
 1/3
xB
1
(V − p
T
B − p
S
BB + k − t((1/3) − x))dx +
 xB
3
1/3
(V − p
T
B − p
S
BB + k − t(x − (1/3))dx +
 2/3
xB
3
(V − p
T
C − p
S
BC − t((2/3) − x))dx +
 xB
4
2/3
(V − p
T
C − p
S
BC − t(x − (2/3))dx +
 1
xB
2
(V − pAT − p
S
BA − t(1 − x))dx]+
n3[
 xC
1
0
(V − p
T
A − p
S
CA − tx)dx +
 1/3
xC
4
(V − p
T
B − p
S
CB − t((1/3) − x)dx +
 xC
3
1/3
(V − p
T
B − p
S
CB − t(x − (1/3))dx +
 2/3
xC
3
(V − p
T
C − p
S
CC + k − t((2/3) − x)dx +
 xC
2
2/3
(V − p
T
C − p
S
CC + k − t(x − (2/3))dx +
 1
xC
2
(V − p
T
A − p
S
CA − t(1 − x))dx
Plugging in the respective equilibrium prices for the symmetric case with vertical
integration of only A yields after some tedious calculations:
TS=
(64896v(3
2v + t − 2y) + 50700k(3
2k + t +3 y) − 115934t2 + 7436ty + 203289y2
608400t
(52)
For the symmetric case with vertical integration of all ﬁnancial-security service provider
we get
TS=
(192v(3
2v + t − 2y) + 150k(3
2k + t +6 y) − 343t2 + 108ty + 1188y2
1800t
(53)
and for horizontal integration
TS =
(192(3
2v + t +3 by) + 150k(3
2k + t) − 343t2 + 192tby + 288b2y2
1800t
(54)
Welfare is then calculated as the sum of consumer surplus and the sum of proﬁts.
37P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Part i)
The fact that vertical integration is privately more attractive if all other platforms are
already vertically integrated as compared to a situation in which the other platforms are
not yet vertically can be seen as follows. When computing our proﬁt diﬀerence for A we
get:
Δ(π
S
A + π
T
A)A+B = y
36075k + 6097t − 17784v + 47160y
152100t
(55)
The denominator of this expression is lowest, if we, against the background of our as-
sumptions allow for the lowest k (k =
1
3t)a n dy (y = 0) as well as for the highest feasible
v(v = 11
12t). With these parameter combinations we get for the term in brackets in the
denominator of Eq. (55)
(12025t + 6097t − 16302t) = 1820t>0
Part ii)
More interesting is now the comparison of private proﬁts of the ﬁnancial-security service
providers. The diﬀerence of A’s proﬁt amounts to
Δ(π
S
A + π
T
A)=y
75k + t − 72V + 111y
225t
(56)
Comparing this with Eq. (13) shows that now the Delta is positive for a smaller set
of parameters.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
We compare Eqs. (13) and (16). We set Eq. (13) equal to zero and solve for k. Inserting
this k into Eq. (16) gives us, after evaluating at y = 0 the following expression for the
numerator of Eq. (16):
−
24107241610v + 8158948200t
189900
< 0
Hence, if private incentives leave platform A just indiﬀerent, stand-alone integration leads
to lower welfare, thereby proving our claim.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
We compare Eqs. (13) and (17). We set Eq. (13) equal to zero and solve for k. Inserting
this k into Eq. (17) gives us, after evaluating at y = 0 the following expression for the
numerator of Eq. (17):
842400v + 220050t
198900
> 0
Hence, if private incentives leave platform A just indiﬀerent, full-integration leads, com-
pared to no integration to a higher social welfare level, thereby proving our claim.
38Derivation of Eq. (18)
With horizontal integration we derive from Eqs. (10)-(12) the following prices in equilib-
rium:
p
T
i =
1
5
V −
1
5
c
S +
12
15
c
T +
1
15
t +
1
5
by (57)
p
S
ii =
2
5
V +
3
5
c
S −
2
5
c
T +
1
2
k +
3
10
t −
3
5
by (58)
p
S
ij =
2
5
V +
3
5
c
S −
2
5
c
T +
2
15
t −
3
5
by (59)
Plugging these prices into the demand functions of the trading platforms allows us to
derive the following diﬀerential proﬁt expression for all settlement provider (i.e. the sum of
settlement providers’ proﬁts after horizontal integration minus the one before integration):
Δ(π
s
A + π
s
B + π
s
C)=8 by
2t +6 v +3 by
75t
.
39CFS Working Paper Series: 
 
No.  Author(s)  Title 
2010/21  Marcel Marekwica 
Michael Stamos 
Optimal life cycle portfolio choice with housing 
market cycles 
2010/20  Mahmoud Botshekan 
Roman Kraeussl 
Andre Lucas 
Cash Flow and Discount Rate Risk in Up and 
Down Markets: What Is Actually Priced? 
2010/19  Nikolaus Hautsch 
Peter Malec 
Melanie Schienle 
Capturing the Zero: A New Class of Zero-
Augmented Distributions and Multiplicative 
Error Processes 
2010/18  Horst Entorf 
Christian Knoll 
Liliya Sattarova 
Measuring Confidence and Uncertainty during 
the Financial Crisis: Evidence from the CFS 
Survey 
2010/17  Nikolaus Hautsch 
Mark Podolskij 
Pre-Averaging Based Estimation of Quadratic 
Variation in the Presence of Noise and Jumps: 
Theory, Implementation, and Empirical 
Evidence 
2010/16  Tullio Jappelli  Economic Literacy: An International 
Comparison 
2010/15  Bartholomäus Ende 
Marco Lutat 
Trade-throughs in European Cross-traded 
Equities After Transaction Costs – Empirical 
Evidence for the EURO STOXX 50 – 
2010/14  Terrence Hendershott 
Albert J. Menkveld 
Price Pressures 
2010/13  Sarah Draus  Does Inter-Market Competition Lead to Less 
Regulation? 
2010/11  Annamaria Lusardi 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
How Ordinary Consumers Make Complex 
Economic Decisions: Financial Literacy and 
Retirement Readiness 
 
Copies of working papers can be downloaded at http://www.ifk-cfs.de  